I. North Korea’s Existence as Frog in a Well
North Korea conducted a nuclear test on January 6th. Political authorities in North Korea have declared, “With the successful test of a hydrogen bomb, we have joined the league of nations with thermonuclear capabilities.” Upon hearing this news and listening to the domestic and international reaction to it, the author is reminded of the chairperson of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s protest that “Enough is enough!” in the U.N. General Assembly. This frustration does not simply come from the fact that we’ve past the point of tolerable offenses from our northern neighbors. It’s also because we’ve past the point where we can stand to sit back and listen to the reaction of the Korean government, media, and North Korea experts. Looking back at our reactions after the first four nuclear tests, it had become extremely simple to anticipate the exact content of future messages when and if a fifth test occurs in the future.
Through the U.N. Security Council, the South Korean government has ensured there will be stiff punishment in the event of North Korean provocation. But to be frank, when officials and diplomats say these sorts of things, it’s important to note that the U.N. has no military power to speak of and sanctions are not very effective. On the other hand, the fact that Kim Jong Un made no mention of nuclear weapons in his New Year’s speech, and then suddenly conducted a test might be looked at by some as an indicator of North Korea’s unpredictable nature.
But that’s not the case. We saw this 4th test coming from a mile away. In the beginning of this year, the present author appeared at Unification Media Group and said, “As we enter into the latter portion of South Korean President Park Geun Hye’s term, we should expect to see the North pick up their provocations. The likelihood of a nuclear test is therefore higher.”
If we look carefully, Kim Jong Un did actually make a reference to nuclear weapons in his 2016 New Year’s address: “During the celebration in October across Kim Il Sung Square, canvases were hung up featuring nuclear explosions and satellites in orbit. But Kim Jong Un made reference to a capacity that could dwarf those capacities and shake the world. The phrasing was, ‘Even if the heavens fall, a nuclear power remains.’”
Viewed carefully, these words should have been carefully interpreted as Kim Jong Un’s justification for continuing nuclear development and a harbinger of future tests. Yeong Gi Jo, professor of North Korean Studies at Korea University, said, “For North Korea, there is a close association between the New Year’s Address and the nuclear test, which followed one another in quick succession.”
We have already known for a long time that December and January are the perfect time for ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests. As U.N. sanctions are discussed and come into effect, North Korea declares, ‘Prepare for nuclear war!’ and drives its people into a state of emergency on the brink of full scale conflict. But then, a little bit before farming season starts, the Chinese say, ‘We need to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula.’ At the same time, U.N. sanctions start to fizzle out. We need to look at these nuclear tests as one event in a larger series of events.
Among the experts who believe we should no longer tolerate the nuclear tests, some are saying, “Since the tests are designed to help entrench North Korea’s leadership in their positions of power, they are taking non-military methods to gain the attention of the U.S.” If we take the nuclear test and NK’s nuclear power status itself at face value, then it seems like this is the case. Such an argument is consistent with the idea that North Korea develops and tests nuclear weapons for use in a war against the U.S. or Japan. The reason that this position is illogical is clear: the regime uses nuclear weapons as a survival tactic, plain and simple.
Some continue to believe that the North’s nuclear capacity is designed to threaten the South or even as preparation for an invasion. People still judge that the North’s continuation of nuclear development during the Sunshine era of renewed inter-Korean relations was a strategic miscalculation. The truth about North Korea’s nuclear tests is an uncomfortable one. Because of the failure of the Sunshine Policy to denuclearize North Korea, South Koreans have become desensitized to the issue. The people have also lost interest in these sorts of brinksmanship games. However, through it all, the Kim Regime has remained. By using nuclear tests over the last ten years, the North has successfully managed to stay alive by surviving as a frog in a well.
II. The Cause and Consequences of Ignoring the North’s Nuclear Tests
But if that is the truth, then how did the situation devolve into the current mess? The reason is that as a result of the Sunshine Policy, it became much more difficult to respond with force to nuclear tests and provocations. For example, we need to look more closely at the domestic opposition response to former South Korean President Lee Myeong Bak’s “Hard Line” strategy. In South Korea, if you don’t defend the North Korean point of view, support North Korea in any way, and don’t show any interest in the North, then you are labeled as someone who is in line with the ‘Hard Line’ policy. But in the climate of South Korea’s endless elections, would it really be possible for a candidate to propose having friendly relations with the North? This is a beautiful idea, but the simple truth is that the proposition has become an illogical one because of this climate.
The problem with pursuing friendly ties with North Korea is the methodology. From Kim Young Sam’s administration to Park Geun Hye’s, there are a few important differences, but there are three problematic premises that have remained:
(1) North Korea will respond to the South’s goodwill by reciprocating it
(2) The main lever for inducing action is economic support
(3) In pursuing friendly relations, the South should avoid attempting to destabilize the North
All three of these premises are problematic. There are countless instances of North Korea responding to the South’s goodwill by ignoring it or provoking the South. Further, the idea that in order to maintain their preeminence, the North Korean authorities need financial assistance from the South is overly simple and not entirely true. There is evidence that the North earns an annual sum of 200-400 million dollars in foreign currency. If South Korean financial support really was necessary to upkeep the political stability of the regime, then how have they held onto power for the last 8 years? By selling minerals, exporting human labor, and the continued economic development of Pyongyang, the regime has survived despite the suspension of funds from the South. The suggestion that North Korea is dependent on its Southern neighbor is unfounded. So it is important that we do not conflate the idea that North Korea wants South Korean money with the idea that it needs it in order to stay in power.
Lastly, the best method to bring the North Koreans to the negotiating table is to try to exacerbate their weaknesses. The South’s usage of propaganda loudspeakers in the DMZ during the August landmine incident is a good example of that principle. The North was put at ease when the megaphone broadcasts were stopped through negotiations, and it is in that relaxed atmosphere that they conducted the nuclear test. We can thus conclude that it is only when the South has the power to influence the fate of the regime that North Korea faces up to the South on sincere terms.
North Korea has been able to take advantage of one of the South Korean government core structural weaknesses: the one term limit on the office of the president. North Korea ignored South Korea’s suggestion of good neighbor relations through inaction. The North has been able to take advantage of the difficulty facing late term and early term presidents when they attempt a transition in their unification strategy. By using provocations during such periods, they’ve been able to extract large amounts of financial support. Kim Dae Jung and
Roh Moo Hyun’s administrations are good illustrations, particularly the moment when the late president signed a peace declaration with Kim Jong Il on October 4th, 2007. If South Korea had made stronger preconditions for the economic aid, the North would never have been able to respond to the friendly neighbor policy with inaction and outright provocation. North Korea’s provocations to Lee Myeong Bak’s South Korea in subsequent years are examples of this.
Park Geun Hye’s policy stressing the “Trust Building Process” is certainly not immune from falling into the same exact traps that other administrations have fallen victim to. There are weaknesses of the “Trust Building Process” strategy that relate to the one term limit of the Korean presidency. If the current administration’s strategy is effective, that is evidence that the hard line policy of the previous administration is not receiving serious criticism inside Korea. But the current administration’s policies will never be enough to solve the nuclear problem.
When it comes to peninsular policy and unification strategies, the most effective method is to reach consensus with the surrounding nations in order to expose and take advantage of North Korea’s vulnerabilities. This way the South can secure the leadership position in North-South relations. So if we were to talk specifics, what methods could the South use given the current political climate? The single best method is to increase the quantity and quality of outside information that reaches inside North Korea’s borders. This is not limited to loudspeaker broadcasts at the DMZ. It should also encompass efforts spanning from TV to radio and wireless internet in order to extensively infuse the North with outside ideas and information. Additionally, we need to re-tool and modernize Korean Broadcasting System’s (KBS) One People Radio (Han Minjok Bansong) broadcasting to North Korea. While it currently reaches a wide audience, it suffers from poor quality. We need to revamp it in order to grab the hearts and minds of everyday North Korean people. In the road ahead, we need to design and implement a system wherein we can use Hallyu (international popularity of South Korean cultural content) information to stimulate the imagination and repressed opinions of North Korean residents.
There have been suggestions that South Korea should confront the North Korean nuclear threat by means of a Kill Chain, high altitude missile defense system (THAAD), or through the development of our own nuclear weapons technology. Of course, in terms of physical defenses, these are not preposterous suggestions. However, it would be a grave miscalculation to disregard the impact of information distribution. That’s because the weaponized defense solutions to the North’s provocations will amplify the South’s security, but they do not represent fields in which the South can take the lead in peacefully reducing the lifespan of the regime. Although, we must admit there are those who categorize information distribution as an act of military aggression since it does present such a grave threat to the lifeblood of the regime.
However, we have entered into a time period wherein it is extremely difficult for the North to respond effectively to a massive information dump. That is because, in the wake of their ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests, they are on the receiving end of intense scrutiny from the U.N. and the international community at large. To judge North Korea’s strategic outlook at this point, some are suggesting that even China is considering changing their normal tactic of using passive means to influence their ally to cease nuclear tests by taking a bit of a harder line. In such a climate, North Korea has to understand that responding to a massive information transfusion from South Korea with a military provocation would certainly invite major instability and potentially signal the end of the Kim Regime. That’s why this is the perfect time for South Korea to use peaceful, punitive measures.
It might also be prudent to look into the benefits of potentially closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex. On the one hand, there are calls for strong retaliatory responses to the nuclear test. On the other hand, the fact that South Korea sends 1,100 voluntary hostages to help North Korea earn foreign currency to fund their nuclear development is enough to cast doubt on the sincerity of the United Nations sanctions against North Korea that the South Korean government supports. The more difficult and complex a problem is, the more important it is to look for ways to simplify it. The Park Geun Hye government has an excellent opportunity to do just that in 2016.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
