Pakistan may be the next victim of China's new
'imperialism'
It’s been barely more than two
weeks since Imran Khan’s electoral
victory in Pakistan, but the country’s next prime minister is already
facing a geopolitical crisis. Pakistan’s current-account deficit is
perilously high, its foreign-currency reserves perilously low. Its external
debt has ballooned after accepting some $62 billion in Chinese financing,
part of an ambitious regional infrastructure project that has yet to boost
Pakistan’s economy. Khan’s first major act as prime minister may be asking the International
Monetary Fund for a new bailout.
Moreover, the initiative has pushed
some countries into a morass of debt. The starkest example so far has been
Sri Lanka, whose government was unable to repay $6 billion in loans used to
build an expensive Chinese-led port and airport project in Hambantota, a
once-sleepy but strategically located backwater. As a result, Sri Lankan
authorities ceded control of the port and some 15,000 acres of land around
it to Beijing on a 99-year lease. The move led to accusations that China is
engaging in a 21st century
style of “creditor imperialism."
Fishermen
stand on a boat outside Gwadar Port, operated by China Overseas Ports
Holding Co., in Gwadar, Pakistan on July 4. (Asim Hafeez/Bloomberg)
At a Tuesday panel in Washington,
Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani ambassador to Washington, quipped that
the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor — the formal name for a complex $62
billion infrastructure-development plan — actually should be called
“Colonizing Pakistan to Enrich China.”
Both Chinese and Pakistani
officials argue that charges of “colonialism” are overblown. The
two countries share a historic friendship, largely framed by their mutual
antipathy toward India. In recent years, China has stepped up its
involvement in various sectors of the Pakistani economy, from its
nuclear-energy industry to the establishment of a host of special economic
zones to a costly port project in the city of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea.
“Pakistan does need China’s help,
as it faces a slew of economic challenges, including a backward industrial
supply chain, weak foreign trade and a huge portion of its population still
living in poverty and without proper education,” noted an editorial in China’s
state-run Global Times, urging Beijing officials to “ignore the noise
and step up its investment in Pakistan.”
Khan, meanwhile, is a fiery
nationalist and economic populist. He has repeatedly gestured to the “China
model” as something Pakistan should
emulate. But it’s not yet clear what any of that means in practice, and
the enthusiasm for his rhetoric may simply reflects widespread frustration
with Pakistan’s systemic corruption and long-standing habit of turning to
the IMF and accepting its diktats.
Khan doesn’t look set to break that
tradition. But the Trump administration may force him to.
“Make no mistake. We will be watching what the IMF does,” said Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo at the end of last month, arguing that he didn’t want the U.S.
to indirectly refinance Pakistani loans to China. “There’s no rationale for
IMF tax dollars — and, associated with that, American dollars that are part
of the IMF funding — for those to go to bail out Chinese bondholders or
China itself."
“The goal for the [Belt and Road
Initiative] is the creation of an economic world order ultimately dominated
by China,” read a recent letter from
a bipartisan group of senators to Pompeo and Treasury Secretary Steven T.
Mnuchin. “It is imperative that the United States counters China’s attempts
to hold other countries financially hostage and force ransoms that further
its geostrategic goals.”
For Pakistan, caught between
China’s ambition and Washington’s concern, there are few good choices.
“These are our two masters,” said
Turab Hussain, an economics professor at the Lahore University of
Management Sciences, told the New York Times.
“How do you serve both?”
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