ISSN 1076-9005
Volume 25, 2018
The Atipada Problem in
Buddhist Meta-Ethics
Gordon F. Davis
Carleton University
We can express a wide
range of objections to philosophical views by saying a view “goes too
far”; but there is a more specific pitfall, which opens up when a
philosopher seeks to generalize some form of anti-realism in such a way
that it must itself be pronounced groundless or incoherent by its own
standards. In cases where this self-stultification looks impossible to
overcome without revising the view in question, it can be called the atipada problem.
Signifying a risk of “overstepping,” this Sanskrit label reflects a
particular relevance to Mahāyāna ethicists who seek to enlarge the scope
of compassion by enlarging the meaning of emptiness (śūnyatā) to the
point where all truths and ideals are pronounced ultimately empty, and
likewise, at least ipso facto, the ideal of compassion itself. This
incarnation of the problem is left unresolved by several recent defenders
of Madhyamaka ethics, as well as by one recent interpreter of Vasubandhu;
meanwhile, some Buddhist ethicists who try to avoid theorizing at this
“ultimate” level run into the same general problem nonetheless. More than
a specialized meta-ethical puzzle, this problem threatens to undermine
central Buddhist ideals in precisely those contexts where philosophical
ethics is invoked to vindicate them; however, rather than disposing us to
foreswear meta-ethics in an attempt to avoid the problematic views in
question, the problem should lead us to expand the scope of Buddhist
meta-ethics.
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