The Moon-Kim overture and the Trump-Kim duet
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I am on the record as sceptical about the chances for success of the current negotiations
addressing the security situation on the Korean peninsula. We have seen versions of this
drama before – in 1972, 1992, 1994, 2000, 2005 and 2007 – and each time has
ended ignominiously.
addressing the security situation on the Korean peninsula. We have seen versions of this
drama before – in 1972, 1992, 1994, 2000, 2005 and 2007 – and each time has
ended ignominiously.
Diplomacy and rapprochement are important and necessary, and at the least have
reduced the tensions of the 2017 Korean peninsula crisis, but I am concerned by the
fact that the new iteration of détente is starting quickly, with summits between
South Korean president Moon Jae In, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and
US president Donald Trump. Beginning at such a high level carries major risks – beyond
summits often lie cliffs.
reduced the tensions of the 2017 Korean peninsula crisis, but I am concerned by the
fact that the new iteration of détente is starting quickly, with summits between
South Korean president Moon Jae In, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and
US president Donald Trump. Beginning at such a high level carries major risks – beyond
summits often lie cliffs.
That said, one cannot deny the powerful imagery of the Moon-Kim meeting, broadcast live,
around the world, on 27 April 2018. Kim’s crossing of the military demarcation line s
eparating North from South was historic; Moon’s grace in welcoming his frère ennemi
was inspiring; the two leaders’ strolling discussion on a footbridge, filmed live without audio,
was dramatic. The whole production was fascinating, almost operatic in intensity as day
turned to dusk and the two Korean delegations gathered to break bread before Kim’s return
to Pyongyang.
around the world, on 27 April 2018. Kim’s crossing of the military demarcation line s
eparating North from South was historic; Moon’s grace in welcoming his frère ennemi
was inspiring; the two leaders’ strolling discussion on a footbridge, filmed live without audio,
was dramatic. The whole production was fascinating, almost operatic in intensity as day
turned to dusk and the two Korean delegations gathered to break bread before Kim’s return
to Pyongyang.
Beyond the choreography
But an operatic overture is just that, and the duet that follows is the heart of the
story hurtling towards fortune or calamity. That duet stands before us, when Trump
and Kim meet in May or June. Despite the ardent symbolism of the third inter
-Korean summit, the cold, hard eye of logic must look beyond choreographed theatricality.
The reality is that little of substance has changed, implementation of even simple measures
has not begun, and we are no closer to understanding a path to a denuclearised North Kore
a than we were before Moon and Kim planted a peace tree in the DMZ.
story hurtling towards fortune or calamity. That duet stands before us, when Trump
and Kim meet in May or June. Despite the ardent symbolism of the third inter
-Korean summit, the cold, hard eye of logic must look beyond choreographed theatricality.
The reality is that little of substance has changed, implementation of even simple measures
has not begun, and we are no closer to understanding a path to a denuclearised North Kore
a than we were before Moon and Kim planted a peace tree in the DMZ.
The Panmunjom Joint Declaration barely mentions nuclear
weapons, and in fact does so only as a subordinate part of the
establishment of a “peace regime” on the Korean peninsula
The primary question on the Korean peninsula is to what extent and under what conditions
North Korea would be willing to denuclearise. As predicted, this inter-Korean summit did
nothing to answer that question. Indeed, North-South wrangling over definitions and details
of denuclearisation would have ruined the summit, in the event of disagreement, or led to a
Seoul-Washington fissure, if Moon had signed an agreement too injurious to US preferences.
The goal of the Moon-Kim meeting was to demonstrate bonhomie, build confidence in diplomacy,
and establish momentum and tone for the upcoming Trump-Kim summit, which will focus on the
North Korean nuclear weapons programme.
North Korea would be willing to denuclearise. As predicted, this inter-Korean summit did
nothing to answer that question. Indeed, North-South wrangling over definitions and details
of denuclearisation would have ruined the summit, in the event of disagreement, or led to a
Seoul-Washington fissure, if Moon had signed an agreement too injurious to US preferences.
The goal of the Moon-Kim meeting was to demonstrate bonhomie, build confidence in diplomacy,
and establish momentum and tone for the upcoming Trump-Kim summit, which will focus on the
North Korean nuclear weapons programme.
The Panmunjom Joint Declaration barely mentions nuclear weapons, and in fact does so only as
a subordinate part of the establishment of a “peace regime” on the Korean peninsula. The North’s
ballistic missile programme is entirely absent. The Declaration reiterates what we already knew.
Pyongyang views denuclearisation as applying to all of the Korean peninsula, which is code
for an abrogation of the US nuclear umbrella extending strategic deterrence to South Korea.
Given that this condition for North Korea’s dismantlement of its nuclear programme and arsenal
is unacceptable to the US, it is hard to read the Declaration’s denuclearisation passages as
anything other than statements that North Korea intends to remain a nuclear armed state.
a subordinate part of the establishment of a “peace regime” on the Korean peninsula. The North’s
ballistic missile programme is entirely absent. The Declaration reiterates what we already knew.
Pyongyang views denuclearisation as applying to all of the Korean peninsula, which is code
for an abrogation of the US nuclear umbrella extending strategic deterrence to South Korea.
Given that this condition for North Korea’s dismantlement of its nuclear programme and arsenal
is unacceptable to the US, it is hard to read the Declaration’s denuclearisation passages as
anything other than statements that North Korea intends to remain a nuclear armed state.
This is unsurprising, as on 21 April the central committee of North Korea’s ruling Worker’s
Party issued a unilateral nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile testing moratorium
that most analysts interpret as a reinforcement of North Korea’s goal of recognition as a
nuclear power.
That moratorium conspicuously ignores a nuclear programme freeze, as well as medium
-/short-range and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
Party issued a unilateral nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile testing moratorium
that most analysts interpret as a reinforcement of North Korea’s goal of recognition as a
nuclear power.
That moratorium conspicuously ignores a nuclear programme freeze, as well as medium
-/short-range and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
Kicking the can down the road
The one reference to denuclearisation seemingly indicates that North Korea would
consider it in the context of global nuclear disarmament – i.e. Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty article VI – obligatory for all nuclear weapons states, including the US. This is not
the language of a nuclear power prepared to surrender its arsenal. As the 21 April statement
clarifies through references to both nuclear weapon reliability and commitment to responsible
nuclear policies, including that of nonproliferation to other countries, North Korea is apparently
telling the world: “we are a nuclear power now, so get used to it.”
consider it in the context of global nuclear disarmament – i.e. Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty article VI – obligatory for all nuclear weapons states, including the US. This is not
the language of a nuclear power prepared to surrender its arsenal. As the 21 April statement
clarifies through references to both nuclear weapon reliability and commitment to responsible
nuclear policies, including that of nonproliferation to other countries, North Korea is apparently
telling the world: “we are a nuclear power now, so get used to it.”
Some analysts believe Trump’s “maximum pressure” forced
Pyongyang’s hand; othersbelieve Kim has progressed
sufficiently with nuclear arsenal development that he
canegotiate from a position of strength.
This is the context in which we should understand the Panmunjom Declaration’s reference to
“denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula”. The problem is that North Korea’s conception
of denuclearisation has nothing to do with that of the US – a fact well known to the Moon
administration, which nonetheless was willing in the Declaration to hedge on the topic,
forgo definitional issues and kick that particular can down the road to the Trump-Kim
summit.
“denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula”. The problem is that North Korea’s conception
of denuclearisation has nothing to do with that of the US – a fact well known to the Moon
administration, which nonetheless was willing in the Declaration to hedge on the topic,
forgo definitional issues and kick that particular can down the road to the Trump-Kim
summit.
Official US policy demands that North Korea commit to and implement “complete,
verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID)” of its entire nuclear programme and arsenal,
in accordance with United Nations resolutions. The US-North Korea disaccord on
the meaning of denuclearisation is the heart of Trump-Kim negotiations, and one measure
of progress for their summit will be how much a presumed joint statement resolves
the imprecision of the denuclearisation concept in the Panmunjom Declaration.
verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID)” of its entire nuclear programme and arsenal,
in accordance with United Nations resolutions. The US-North Korea disaccord on
the meaning of denuclearisation is the heart of Trump-Kim negotiations, and one measure
of progress for their summit will be how much a presumed joint statement resolves
the imprecision of the denuclearisation concept in the Panmunjom Declaration.
An ambitious path to a fantasy goal
The direction of such resolution – North Korea bending toward CVID, or the
US settling for less – will help answer a lingering question: why has Kim come
to the negotiating table? Some analysts believe Trump’s “maximum pressure”
forced Pyongyang’s hand; others believe Kim has progressed sufficiently with
nuclear arsenal development that he can negotiate from a position of strength.
US settling for less – will help answer a lingering question: why has Kim come
to the negotiating table? Some analysts believe Trump’s “maximum pressure”
forced Pyongyang’s hand; others believe Kim has progressed sufficiently with
nuclear arsenal development that he can negotiate from a position of strength.
If the former is true, we may see a quick breakthrough on North Korean.
If the latter is true, two possibilities present themselves: (a) a deal in which the US
de facto recognises North Korea as a nuclear power through settling for a
programme cap-and-freeze; and (b) although less likely, a Trump decision that military strikes
against North Korea are necessary. Perhaps, most likely, both factors led Kim to negotiations.
In that case we are in for a tedious process involving devilish details on timing and
implementation of a compromise agreement that – in a phased process and anchored
in a “big package” that includes a “peace regime”, inter-Korean rapprochement and loosened
sanctions – verifiably caps and freezes the North Korea nuclear programme, with CVID saved
for a distance
If the latter is true, two possibilities present themselves: (a) a deal in which the US
de facto recognises North Korea as a nuclear power through settling for a
programme cap-and-freeze; and (b) although less likely, a Trump decision that military strikes
against North Korea are necessary. Perhaps, most likely, both factors led Kim to negotiations.
In that case we are in for a tedious process involving devilish details on timing and
implementation of a compromise agreement that – in a phased process and anchored
in a “big package” that includes a “peace regime”, inter-Korean rapprochement and loosened
sanctions – verifiably caps and freezes the North Korea nuclear programme, with CVID saved
for a distance
In contrast to the uncertainties of denuclearisation, we have a better idea of what North-South
reconciliation should look like, even if the path is ambitious and the stated goal – peninsula
r peace and eventual national unification – seems like fantasy. Indeed, much of the
Panmunjom Declaration’s language in this regard stems from past agreements, and
the fact that we are still trying to solve the Korean peninsula conundrum speaks
volumes about their success.
reconciliation should look like, even if the path is ambitious and the stated goal – peninsula
r peace and eventual national unification – seems like fantasy. Indeed, much of the
Panmunjom Declaration’s language in this regard stems from past agreements, and
the fact that we are still trying to solve the Korean peninsula conundrum speaks
volumes about their success.
Pitfalls and progress
Scepticism aside, there is much to like in terms of improved inter-Korean relations and
reduced military tensions: high-level and working-group intergovernmental meetings;
sports and cultural diplomacy; divided-family reunions; inter-Korean military-military
confidence building and phased conventional military de-escalation; peace-building efforts
this year and beyond to replace the armistice with a peace treaty; and a follow-up Moon-Kim
summit in the autumn. Importantly, the date markers on several of these items will
signpost progress.
reduced military tensions: high-level and working-group intergovernmental meetings;
sports and cultural diplomacy; divided-family reunions; inter-Korean military-military
confidence building and phased conventional military de-escalation; peace-building efforts
this year and beyond to replace the armistice with a peace treaty; and a follow-up Moon-Kim
summit in the autumn. Importantly, the date markers on several of these items will
signpost progress.
The Declaration also contains, however, pitfalls both familiar and novel: proscribed
“hostile acts” are vague, providing convenient potential grounds for abrogation;
veiled references to inter-Korean economic cooperation imply sanctions rollback that may
conflict with Washington’s timeline; and Japan’s exclusion and China’s inclusion in the
effort to internationalise Korean peninsula security indicates that Beijing is attempting to
channel negotiations to its strategic benefit. Possibly there are also unknowns such as
unreported side agreements between Moon and Kim.
“hostile acts” are vague, providing convenient potential grounds for abrogation;
veiled references to inter-Korean economic cooperation imply sanctions rollback that may
conflict with Washington’s timeline; and Japan’s exclusion and China’s inclusion in the
effort to internationalise Korean peninsula security indicates that Beijing is attempting to
channel negotiations to its strategic benefit. Possibly there are also unknowns such as
unreported side agreements between Moon and Kim.
In sum, the 27 April 2018 summit produced a variably detailed roadmap for three areas:
inter-Korean cooperation, reductions in military tension on the Korean peninsula and the
building of a “peace regime”, including denuclearisation. Arguably the most critical
take-away is that all three areas are connected, and the fact that Moon and Kim seem
to have settled on a “big package” approach means that parallel progress in all areas will
be required. When the curtain rises on Act II of Korean peninsula summitry, we will see
whether Trump and Kim hit the right notes to propel this unfolding story forward.
inter-Korean cooperation, reductions in military tension on the Korean peninsula and the
building of a “peace regime”, including denuclearisation. Arguably the most critical
take-away is that all three areas are connected, and the fact that Moon and Kim seem
to have settled on a “big package” approach means that parallel progress in all areas will
be required. When the curtain rises on Act II of Korean peninsula summitry, we will see
whether Trump and Kim hit the right notes to propel this unfolding story forward.
